Collective Memory and Amnesia as a Political Tool: Four Cases of Nation-Building in the Aftermath of Conflicts

Natalie Sturza

The Science of the Forgotten: Hybrid Vigor 2022-2023 Edition

“History combines in our language the objective as well as the subjective side. It means both res gestae (the things that happened) and historica rerum gestarum (the narration of the things that happened)” (Funkenstein). 

“Just as an individual’s memory is a story of the past from that individual’s point of view, so too a nation’s memory is a story of the past from its point of view” (Poole).

INSPIRATION 

In my last year of middle school, feeling slightly rebellious, I considered shaving my hair off entirely. My maman, who is French and had supported a prior violation of the school’s dress code by painting blue dye into my hair, objected to this. Her reasoning was not rooted in outdated gender norms or a desire to avoid provoking my teachers any further, but from an association to an unsanctioned yet widespread practice in France during the 1940s of publicly shaving the heads of French women accused of being close to members of the Wehrmacht during World War II (Beevor; Mah). At least 20,000 women, despised for having supposedly betrayed la patrie and collaborated with the enemy, were publicly degraded in this way. Their shaved heads marked them as traitors and social pariahs, and the condemnation continued long after their hair grew back. These events happened over 20 years before my maman was born and about seven decades prior to my musings about a new look. And yet, the inherent shame of assumed Nazi collaboration and resulting social rejection was still so pervasive that the idea of shaving my head was unsettling to her. Five years later, I recalled this incident when I began researching the subject of collective memory. 

DEFINING COLLECTIVE MEMORY 

In 1925, French philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs coined the term la mémoire collective, or collective memory. Its meaning, validity, and application have been debated for decades in the fields of psychology and history, but it can be defined as “a widely shared knowledge of past social events that may not have been personally experienced but are collectively constructed through communicative social functions” (Paez). These events, publicly understood and accepted, can be a specific moment, such as a speech broadcast or an assassination, or cover a longer period, like a war. They may be positive or negative. Their significance might evolve over time, generally in response to changes in social and political context. In addition, events can be forgotten or resurrected, often the result of political motivation, with the past being seized and exploited to answer to present-day demands. 

Collective memories provoke powerful, shared emotions and affect the social identity, institutions, and way of life of specific communities, which could be geographical, racial, ethnic, religious, and so on. Usually, collective memory refers to the members of a nation, and as such,

is disseminated formally through official narratives, holidays, monuments, commemorations, and textbooks, as well as informally through media, literature, films, and personal artifacts (Paez). Such representations are important for several reasons: they provide a historical legacy and a source of pride to the group, they characterize and vivify the group, and they can be wielded to legitimize and justify actions taken by the group. 

Some studies on collective memory focus specifically on the creation of the nation-state. Others center on the impact of war and genocide. Just as individual memory can be traumatic for individuals, collective memory can cause nations to struggle to heal after painful times. Conversely, it can promote nation-building or rebuilding after tragic events. This article examines three cases that demonstrate how collective memory was used, even weaponized, as a political tool by nations to move forward in the aftermath of conflicts, often at the expense of victims who then sought recognition of their own experiences. Collective denials in Austria and Japan after WWII, and collective amnesia in Spain after Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, illustrate how the identities of these nations were shaped by political responses to tragedies; a fourth case involving the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq and the 1988 Anfal Campaign exemplifies the use of collective memory in the formation of a national identity, with an eye toward nation-building. 

COLLECTIVE DENIAL IN AUSTRIA FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II 

During the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Allies identified Austria as the first victim of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and Austria was quick to adopt this narrative, despite the overwhelming support of Austrians for the Anschluss (Eckert). According to a political referendum conducted a month after the annexation, 99.7% of voters were in favor of it (Langworth). Though the results were rigged by the lack of a secret ballot and the exclusion of political dissidents and ethnic minorities – approximately 8% of the population – most viewed the move as a reunification and not an occupation (Bukey). This opinion was quieted after the war in favor of the victim theory. 

In 1945, a provisional government led by Karl Renner, a former supporter of the Anschluss, established Austria’s Second Republic and embraced this revisionist narrative (Eckert). The victim theory provided the young country, which had only been formed in 1919 following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and whose interwar period was marked by instability, conflicts, and a lack of cultural homogeneity, with a foundational myth that separated and differentiated it from Nazi Germany. It enabled the creation of a national identity that was solely Austrian, as evidenced by references to it in the phrasing of the 1945 Declaration of Independence, the 1955 State Treaty, and official textbooks (Long). It brought together political parties and religious groups that had fought each other before the war, reintegrated Austrian Nazis into society, and allowed the country to evade responsibility and consequences, such as restitution and reparations, for its role in WWII. Western Powers endorsed this narrative, motivated by greater concerns about the Cold War and a desire to include Austria in their sphere

of influence (Manucci). 

The myth of victimization persisted for decades, erasing Austrian actions ranging from casual collaboration to active participation in the genocide of the Jews, Roma, and Sinti. The true victims of Austria’s involvement were silenced and forgotten; their suffering assigned to Austrians instead (Eckert). For instance, the Mauthausen concentration camp was first turned into a commemoration site dedicated to the Austrian fight for freedom from its foreign occupiers, completely disregarding that only a minority of its prisoners had been Austrian, and that Austrians had likely accounted for most of the guards. 

It was not until half a century later that Austrian historiography and collective memory began to be critiqued and the country’s role in WWII increasingly acknowledged in public discourse. One significant event was the 1986 Waldheim Affair: Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972-1981, was running for President when the World Jewish Congress, relying on buried and forgotten documents, revealed that Waldheim, drafted into the Wehrmacht during WWII, had lied about his wartime record, and was determined by the United Nations’ War Crimes Commission to be implicated in war crimes in Yugoslavia (Karina; Manucci). Waldheim was elected President, despite this, but it provoked heated debate within Austria and internationally. 

Another milestone was Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky’s live parliamentary speech in 1991, and then again in Israel in 1993, acknowledging Austrian involvement and culpability in Nazi war crimes (Long; Manucci). 81% of the Austrian population agreed, at least partially, with Chancellor Vranitzky’s words. After decades of silence, such an official acknowledgment of responsibility was pivotal. However, heavy debate took place some years later about whether May 8, which marks the end of WWII in the European Theatre, should be celebrated as the day Austria was freed from Germany or mourned as the day Austria was defeated by the Allies (Eckert). 

The case of Austria illustrates how collective memory can be shaped, manipulated, and used as a political tool to forge a national identity and help stabilize a young country, but it also demonstrates the value of investigative work by victims’ groups in challenging false narratives and correcting history. 

COLLECTIVE DENIAL IN JAPAN FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II 

Japan’s collective memory of WWII is arguably more complex than Austria’s. The country holds a legitimate claim of victimhood as a result of the controversial use of the atomic bombs and the air raids that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and severely damaged cities and infrastructure, but it has denied its actions in China, including the Nanjing Massacre, the atrocities committed by Unit 731, the indiscriminate civilian killings, and the mass sexual violence and forced labor it imposed in Korea (West). Japan’s collective denial was enabled by the United States, which had full control of the country after the war and was not beholden to the Allies or other nations that were victims of the Japanese war crimes.

On the advice of England and American General Douglas MacArthur, the United States did not prosecute Emperor Hirohito for his significant involvement in WWII (West). President Truman’s stated policy argued for the demilitarization of Japan and the establishment of a peaceful, democratic society (The United States Department of State). The priorities were to prevent further deterioration, including mass starvation, and to stabilize and rebuild the country (Crane; West). Removing Emperor Hirohito, who held the status of living god in Japanese society, a standing he renounced in 1946, could have caused a rebellion and complicated the occupation. Instead, his continued presence and quiet endorsement of American policies and interests, in exchange for immunity, enabled the implementation of the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas and related programs. The growing tensions of the emerging Cold War strengthened the need for a strategic partnership with Japan, including during the Korean War (Kawamura). 

The Tokyo Trial, held from 1946 to 1948, omitted other key figures. Leading members of Unit 731, which was characterized by inhumane experiments on humans, traded their results with the United States to avoid prosecution (MacDonald). Japan’s war crimes were covered up and the country did not have to confront its actions. Since the nation’s statesmen were able to avoid admitting responsibility, a belief emerged that they were truly not involved or complicit in war crimes, and so neither were the people (Kawamura; Suzuki; West). This narrative was compounded by a lack of accessible primary sources, some held in the Imperial Household Agency’s archives, and the fact that the Emperor is best remembered for his radio surrender in the aftermath of the atomic bombings, which concretized the incontrovertible myth that Emperor Hirohito and the atomic bombs ended WWII in the Pacific Theatre and brought peace to Japan (Kawamura). 

Attempts by Japanese historians and victims of Japanese war crimes to reckon with the past have been met with resistance and controversy, notably in the field of education (Inuzuka; Suh). In Japan, all textbooks must be approved by the Ministry of Education before they can be published and disseminated. The department, well-known for its history of censoring content critical or negative towards Japan, has blocked textbooks that mention the war crimes committed during WWII. The Ministry was sued by historian Saburō Ienaga for unconstitutional textbook screening, or censoring, three times between the 1960s-1990s (Inuzuka). His resounding victory in the third trial finally allowed historians to write about controversial topics. For his relentless efforts, he was twice nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. However, in 2001, a conservative countermovement called the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) successfully published its own textbook, which justified Japan’s invasions of Asian countries and glorified its military past. The international backlash, especially from China and South Korea, was intense. 

Japan’s collective denial of its war crimes has strained relationships with neighboring countries for nearly a century (Le). When victims, such as the Korean comfort women, went public to seek recognition, they were met with incredulity from the Japanese public and government (Crane). Apologies were made to them in 1992 by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa

and other cabinet members, but a more recent government position has once again turned to denial, illustrated by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s comments in 2007 (Tabuchi; Wikipedia contributors). Although some victims have been compensated, they wish for legal prosecution of their perpetrators (Se-jeong). No specific apology has been issued for others, such as the victims of Unit 731, from which there were no survivors. 

In the case of Japan, collective denial facilitated the rebuilding of the country in the aftermath of WWII and served American interests in the region. However, the surviving victims generally feel as though they have not received genuine acknowledgement and reparations, and have been disregarded by several of the world powers in favor of geopolitical motivations and interests (Le). 

COLLECTIVE AMNESIA IN SPAIN FOLLOWING FRANCISCO FRANCO’S DICTATORSHIP 

An instance of deliberate collective amnesia was implemented in Spain in the 1970s, politically motivated by a desire to heal the country following the decades-long dictatorship of Francisco Franco. In 1936, the Spanish right-wing failed in its coup against the democratically elected leftist government but won the subsequent brutal three-year Civil War, leading to the rule of Franco for the next 36 years (Conroy; Xidias). Under his dictatorship, the country endured what some historians now call the Spanish Holocaust, a title justified by the wide range of repressive actions taken to intimidate, persecute, and remove anyone who opposed the regime, and to wipe out any collective identity other than the ideology of nacionalcatolicismo (national Catholicism), a fusing of Spanish imperialism and Catholicism. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed during and after the Civil War, and an estimated 120,000 were forcibly disappeared during this time. With few of the thousands of known mass graves across the country excavated so far, many individuals are still unaccounted for (Spain). 

Following Franco’s death in 1975, el pacto del olvido (the Pact of Forgetting), an understanding between the political parties of Spain was negotiated and subsequently enacted as the Amnesty Law of 1977 (Conroy). This law pardoned victims of the regime who had been arrested, exiled, or executed. In exchange, perpetrators were similarly pardoned and granted immunity from prosecution. The overarching goal was to establish a democratic government as quickly as possible without triggering new hostilities or continued authoritarianism. Ensuring peaceful coexistence took precedent over coming to terms with the past, to the point that the past was forcibly repressed in the nation’s collective memory. 

The movement to rehabilitate the victims achieved a victory in 2007, with the enactment of the Law of Historical Memory, which finally recognized the victims of both sides of the Civil War and condemned Franco’s rule, but it was criticized by the political opposition (Aguilar; Conroy; Faber). The more recent 2022 Democratic Memory Law commands the state to identify the remains buried in unmarked single and mass graves all over the country, to convert the Valley of the Fallen, which displayed Franco’s tomb until 2019 and still features the grave of José

Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Spanish Falange (fascist) party, into a civil cemetery, and bans any public support of Franco (Conroy; Faber). The Spanish press regularly reports on the tens of thousands of individuals, stolen at birth to be placed with families loyal to Franco, looking to reconnect with their families of origin (Conroy). Unfortunately, despite these commitments, there has been a lack of active effort and cooperation from local authorities and the government, and most individuals and families have had to independently determine the location of lost relatives’ remains or track down still-living ones, using their own resources in the face of bureaucratic hurdles (Spain; United Nations Human Rights Council. (2014, July 2); United Nations Human Rights Council (2017, September 7)). 

Spain’s complex relationship with its historical legacy shows that there is no easy solution in addressing an undemocratic-turned-democratic country’s past during the transition period (Aguilar). If the nation had tried to acknowledge its recent past sooner, the government may not have been stable and legitimate enough to withstand the repercussions. Just like in Austria, once stability is achieved and many perpetrators deceased, it becomes easier and less emotionally fraught to reassess collective memory. One consequence is that with half a century gone by, victims have also died without ever receiving justice or reuniting with family members. Another is that collective memory, initially used as a political tool for the greater good, effectively becomes flawed history for the younger generations. Developing a revised collective memory based on facts more than narration requires the active involvement and support of governments, the work of historians and investigative reporters, and changes in official educational policies. The process of searching for and deciding which memories to discard and preserve is still ongoing in the Spanish government and society. 

NATION-BUILDING BY THE IRAQI KURDS USING THE COLLECTIVE MEMORIES OF THE 1988 ANFAL CAMPAIGN 

The Kurds are an ethnicity geographically split between several countries in the Middle East, primarily Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria, and despite the formation of the autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq in 1992, they are still a nation without a state; this distinction likely has the greatest influence on their political intentions (Toivanen). During the 1980s, the Iraqi Kurds were ruthlessly persecuted by Saddam Hussein’s regime, notably during the Anfal Campaign of 1988, a brutal crusade consisting of eight campaigns that intended to obliterate the Iraqi Kurdish communities and ultimately wiped out about 3,000 villages, with death estimates ranging from 50,000-180,000 (Hardi). 

One attack, against the town of Halabja, caused 5,000 deaths and up to 10,000 injured, many of them for life, when chemical weapons were dropped by Iraqi warplanes (Toivanen). This single attack against the Kurds has been likened to the bombing of Guernica against the Basques and, given the nature of the weapons used and subsequent health problems experienced by the survivors, the Anfal has even been called a Kurdish Hiroshima (Hardi). In addition to shelling and chemical attacks, survivors were sent to prison camps, if they were not executed, with some managing to flee to neighboring countries. 

When Hussein was apprehended, the charges against him included genocide against the Kurds, though he was executed before he could be found guilty (Hardi). Similarly, his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, was deemed guilty for his prominent role in the Halabja massacre but executed before the prosecution could examine the charge of genocide. Despite the common response of denial from those Iraqi leaders who were charged with genocide, arguing that the attacks were a response to the presence and actions of pro-Iranian Kurdish insurgent groups and not civilians, as well as a lack of an official international response, commemorations of the Anfal have become essential to the Kurdish national identity promoted by the KRG, as well as the Kurdish collective memory (Hamarafiq; Szanto). The memory of the Anfal campaigns have been transmitted to the next generation, with the genocide being used not only to define their status as victims, but also as survivors. 

The KRG has been advocating for the creation of an independent country, invoking the Anfal Campaign to do so, and using it as a historical reference to lay down the foundations of a Kurdish identity and state. The campaign has become a rallying point for politicians in their effort to build a collective memory that supports nation-building. Selective images of the Anfal are now used to bolster election campaigns, leading to claims of manipulation and staged remembrances (Toivanen). Discourse over what should be remembered about the Anfal, both within the official and unofficial narratives, and how it is remembered has been prominent in the Kurdistan Region. Propaganda and media manipulation are evident, with TV, radio, and other platforms specifically searching for survivors whose accounts and testimonies are supportive of the KRG. These stories feature heavily in regular broadcasting, even decades later (Hamarafiq; Szanto). Monuments such as Tears of Anfal, Pains of Anfal, and Black Clouds of Anfal are meant to recall the tragic events, but they are not without controversy (Hamarafiq). One such example is the Monument of Halabja Martyrs, which was erected in 2003 and received significant international attention (Hamarafiq; Rubin; Toivanen). To the residents of Halabja, which was still heavily damaged and had received little aid from the government to rebuild its infrastructure, it felt like a mockery and exploitation of their suffering. This resentment culminated in a group of 3,000 to 5,000 protestors destroying the monument in 2006 (Rubin). 

While the victims of the Austrian, Japanese, and Spanish atrocities may seek acknowledgement and reparations for events from the distant past forgotten in the name of politics, the Kurds face a different issue. Repetitive reminders of the relatively recent Anfal campaign deepen the psychological trauma of the population and make it difficult to move on. The KRG is politically motivated to broadcast images and commemorations to strengthen the Kurdish identity both in Iraq and abroad and to appeal to international audiences, but it comes at a cost to the victims who struggle to achieve closure. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will be effective in advancing and facilitating the establishment of an independent nation. 

CONCLUSION

Traumatic memories shared by groups of people can develop into collective traumatic memories that are passed down over time and become a cornerstone of that group’s identity. However, as seen in this article, such memories are highly susceptible to manipulation by governments and politicians, who may promote chosen denial and ignorance, amnesia, or overconsumption to achieve their objectives. Events can be forgotten, emphasized, or distorted to fit a narrative or the development of a myth, or to avoid having to acknowledge the blood on the hands of one’s homeland. While the initial intentions may be positive ones, initiated in the name of the greater good and aimed at stabilizing and rebuilding countries, they are consequential for the victims who should not be forgotten. On the one hand, survivors deserve for their testimonies to be heard, acknowledged, and possibly form the basis of more nuanced collective memories (Ratner; Ristea). On the other hand, their accounts must be treated respectfully and not dismissed or manipulated for selfish benefit. Different groups have different circumstances, experiences, and aftermaths. As such, the process of forming a collective memory is never the same. Ultimately though, the goal is to heal from the past, and just like with individual humans, healing on a large scale is often a messy and complex process. The outcome is a present that is defined by its memory of the past. 

***

Aguilar, P., & Humlebæk, C. (2002). Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War. History and Memory, 14(1-2, Special Issue: Images of a Contested Past), 121-164. https://doi.org/10.2979/his.2002.14.1-2.121 

Beevor, A. (2009, June 4). An ugly carnival. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jun/05/women-victims-d-day-landings-second-w orld-war 

Bukey, E. B. (2002). Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945. The University of North Carolina Press. 

Conroy, A. G. (2021). What is Past is Present: How “Forgetting” in Spain and the United States Has Caused Past Problems to Persist. Fordham University Research Commons, 1-46. https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=international_senior 

Crane, S. A. (2010). The Conundrum of Ephemerality: Time, Memory, and Museums. In S. Macdonald (Ed.), A Companion to Museum Studies (Wiley ed., pp. 98-110). Eckert, R. (2011). Remembering for Whom? Concepts for Memorials in Western Europe. In P. Meusburger, M. Heffernan, & E. Wunder (Eds.), Cultural Memories: The Geographical Point of View (pp. 155-170). Springer Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8945-8 

Faber, S. (2020, April 10). Spain’s New Memory Law Will Finally Recognize Franco’s Victims (Interview by E. Gilmartin) [Transcript]. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2020/10/historical-memory-law-franco-spain-victims 

Funkenstein, A. (1989). Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness. History and Memory, 1(1), 5-26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25618571 

Hamarafiq, R. (2019). Cultural Responses to the Anfal and Halabja Massacres. Genocide Studies International, 13(1), 132-142. https://doi.org/10.3138/gsi.13.1.07 

Hardi, C. (2011). The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds: Chemical Weapons in the Service of Mass Murder. In R. Lemarchand (Ed.), Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory (pp. 106-122). University of Pennsylvania Press. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812204384-008 

Inuzuka, A. (2013). Remembering Japanese Militarism Through the Fusosha Textbook: The Collective Memory of the Asian-Pacific War in Japan. Communication Quarterly, 61(2), 131-150. https://doi.org/10.1080/01463373.2012.751432 

Karina. (1986, March 23). WNBC: Kurt Waldheim was listed by the UN War Crimes Commission as wanted for murder, March 23, 1986 [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/R97kxi1InWc

Kawamura, N. (2016). Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War. University of Washington Press. 

Langworth, R. M. (2020, November 5). Hitler’s “Tet Offensive”: Churchill and the Austrian Anschluss, 1938. The Churchill Project at Hillsdale College. https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/austrian-anschluss-1938/ 

Le, T. P. (2019). Negotiating in Good Faith: Overcoming Legitimacy Problems in the Japan-South Korea Reconciliation Process. The Journal of Asian Studies, 78(4), 621-544. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911819000664 

Long, J. J. (2003). Casual Brutalities: Hans Lebert’s “Die Wolfshaut”, Gerhard Fritsch’s “Fasching” and Austrian Collective Memory. Austrian Studies, 11, 85-101. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/812447 

MacDonald, D. B. (2013). 9: America’s Memory Problems: Diaspora, Civil Society and the Perils of “Chosen Amnesia.” In J.-B. Nie, M. Selden, A. Kleinman, & N. Guo (Eds.), Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History, and Ethics (pp. 166-182). Taylor & Francis. 

Mah, A. (2018, June 6). What Happened to Women in France After D-Day in 1944. Time. https://time.com/5303229/women-after-d-day/ 

Manucci, L. (2019). Populism and Collective Memory: Comparing Fascist Legacies in Western Europe. Taylor & Francis. 

Paez, D. R., & Liu, J. H.-F. (2010). 4: Collective Memory of Conflicts. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective (pp. 105-124). Psychology Press.

Poole, R. (2008). Memory, Responsibility, and Identity. Social Research, 75(1), 263-286. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972060 

Ratner, S. R., Ramcharan, B.G., Akhavan, P., & Ridgway, D. (1988). The Genocide Convention after Fifty Years. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 92(The Challenges of Non-State Actors), 1-19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25659184 

Ristea, I. (2011). The Crime of Genocide in International Criminal Law. Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 3(1), 176-181. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26804851 

Rubin, A. (2006, September). Memorial to Gas Attack Victims Spurs Controversy. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). https://www.pbs.org/americarebuilds2/memorial/memorial_halabja.html 

Se-jeong, K. (2015, December 28). Victims unsatisfied with agreement: 나눔의집 할머니들 “수용못해” vs. “따르겠다” 엇갈려. The Korea Times. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/12/116_194193.html 

Spain. (n.d.). International Commission on Missing Persons. https://www.icmp.int/the-missing/where-are-the-missing/spain/ 

Suh, Y., Yurita, M., Lin, L., & Metzger, S. (2013). Collective Memories of the Second World War in History Textbooks from China, Japan and South Korea. Journal of International Social Studies, 3(1), 34-60. https://iajiss.org/index.php/iajiss/article/view/84 

Suzuki, T. (2018). Emperor Hirohito and The Pacific War. Pacific Affairs, 91(2), 395-397. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/paaf/paaf/2018/00000091/00000002/art00036 

Szanto, E. (2018). Mourning Halabja on Screen: Or Reading Kurdish Politics through Anfal Films. Review of Middle East Studies, 52(1), 135-146. https://doi.org/10.1017/rms.2018.3 

Tabuchi, H. (2007, March 1). Japan’s Abe: No Proof of WWII Sex Slaves. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030100578.html 

Toivanen, M., & Baser, B. (2019). Remembering the Past in Diasporic Spaces. Genocide Studies International, 13(1), 10-33. https://doi.org/10.3138/gsi.13.1.02 

The United States Department of State, The United States Department of War, & United States Department of the Navy. (1945, September 22). Statement of Policy, Approved by the President, Relating to Post-War Japan. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230594 

United Nations Human Rights Council. (2014, July 2). Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Mission to Spain (A/HRC/27/49/Add.1). 

http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/27/49/Add.1&Lang=E 

United Nations Human Rights Council (2017, September 7). Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Follow-up report to the recommendations made by the Working Group: Missions to Chile and Spain (A/HRC/36/39/Add.3). 

http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/36/39/Add.3&Lang=E West, P., Levine, S. I., & Hiltz, J. (1998). America’s Wars in Asia. M.E. Sharpe. 

Wikipedia contributors. (2023, March). List of war apology statements issued by Japan. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_war_apology_statements_issued_by_Japan Xidias, J. (2021). From Franco to Vox: Historical Memory and the Far Right in Spain. CARR

(Center for Analysis of the Radical Right) Research Insight, 1-29. https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Xidias-2021.1-CARR-RI-Final.pdf